By Paul Robinson, Nigel de Lee and Don Carrick, Paul Robinson, Nigel De Lee, Don Carrick
Mr. Robinson, Mr. De Lee, and Mr. Carrick
firstly, thanks a great deal for utilizing my very casual booklet assessment of Thomas Ricks' Fiasco for this booklet, Ethics schooling within the army. i'm the Amazon reviewer known as "M Vigue". really, my identify is William Vigue, and that i used to be a Sergeant hooked up to the 4th Infantry Unit in 2003 and 2004 in Iraq. i haven't learn all your ebook, yet learn the net excerpt on Colonel Sassaman and your trust that he represented disasters in army ethics throughout the preliminary Iraq army crusade. whereas i'm neither an army professional, nor ethics expert...my statement at the Ricks' ebook (Fiasco) was once that he used to be too speedy in charge and make a scapegoat of Colonel Sassaman with out particularly getting a great heritage at the complexities of the realm of Operation for the 4th Infantry in 2003-2004. I had learn Mr. Ricks' booklet - Making the Corps, and had favourite the author's stance on how the submit Vietnam and pre 9-11 army had created a very good volunteer strength that was once made from bad and decrease center classification younger women and men in the USA. I additionally renowned Ricks' competition that lots of America's elites of the put up WW2/Korea iteration had did not serve, and a few had disdain for America's volunteer army in an more and more risky, unstable, and intricate pre-9/11 and submit Bosnia/Haiti global. on reflection at Making the Corps, I felt that he estimated tensions among a civilian led division of safeguard that had leaders who hadn't served in wrestle or any army carrier for that topic utilizing the delicate all volunteer army inappropriately and as an eventually disposable device if want be. Ricks' Making the Corps stated that pre-9/11 American society will be not able to sacrifice to struggle beneficial and bigger scale wars sooner or later. i believe that his commentary used to be useless on and fashionable his portrayal of the army and the Marine Corps of the time. His publication Fiasco stunned me, simply because i think that Colonel Nate Sassaman was once minimize from an analogous textile as males that he favourite in Making the Corps like destiny VA Senator James Webb. He commends Webb for making tough and upcompromising management judgements in Vietnam, and lots compliment on Webb's fictional yet in response to actual studies Fields of Fire.
I do commend your hyperlink of Colonel Sassaman to the U.S. Army's "Warrior Ethos". I firmly agree that he used to be the dwelling, respiring, actual deal essence of what the Warrior Ethos used to be and is for the USA military. rather than easily echoing Thomas Ricks assumptions approximately Sassaman. I by no means observed nor heard of Thomas Ricks even being in theatre in the course of 2003-2004, less the 4th Infantry's quarter of Operation. I want that Sassaman could were judged extra objectively in your half. i feel the mess ups in Iraq of that first yr (OIF-1) begun with the civilian management on the most sensible of the DOD and particularly on the division of country and their mess ups with the CPA in Baghdad. it truly is my opinion that Colonel Sassaman didn't got down to develop into the "warrior king'' because the manhattan instances and Mr. Filkins could have you ever imagine. The 4th Infantry department used to be undermanned and undertrained in very complicated situational setting and consistently lacked help on from self serving larger army professionals, ie; Colonel Rudesheim, who was once Sassaman's better officer that hardly ever left the air conditioned confines of Saddam's Tikrit Palaces, and different commanders like Ricardo Sanchez within the eco-friendly region. No civilian DoD management dared enterprise journeys to make feedback at the flooring, and for the 1st six months in that AO, all we did was once proceed a keeping development whereas we waited for directives on what to do. the entire whereas, the insurgency started to develop and civilians questioned how the robust American army laptop, which ran via their country in exactly 3 weeks didn't have a plan as soon as the Baath get together fell. As extra American squaddies died and no significant information or kind of support from the management on the very best. Colonel Sassaman and his officials had no selection yet to fall again at the Warrior Ethos and its code of taking good care of ones personal squaddies. only a few excessive rating officials of the put up Vietnam military have been keen to probability their careers to do any such factor, particularly with out a transparent plan for this war's post-Saddam Iraq goals. notwithstanding, Colonel Sassaman learned an important factor used to be getting lots of his males again domestic as should be attainable, whereas attempting to support the Iraqis that didn't are looking to the cruelty of Saddam's regime. Ask the Iraqi civilians in predominately Shia urban of Balad in their opinion of Colonel Sassaman, and also you discover he could were elected mayor for how he secure them from the violent Sunni enclaves outdoor in their urban. till the civilian planners and "perfumed princes"(as the past due nice David Hackworth may possibly say), the officials that by no means left imperative Command in Qatar, or the golf green sector in Baghdad, or the palaces of Tikrit got here up with a transparent and possible plan, Sassaman made the easiest offerings that an most unlikely state of affairs may supply. it is simple in hindsight to criticize him in battle faculties and highbrow Ivy towers, with out the complexity and ever altering dynamic of twenty first century conflict at the floor. Going again to the "Warrior Ethos" used to be the appropriate factor to do, no longer the inaccurate process action.
fmr Sgt. William Vigue
411 Civil Affairs connected to third Brigade of 4th Infantry - Oct 2003 to March 2004